Norm entrepreneurs
Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles (1996)Individuals or groups who deliberately campaign to change a norm — making the previously unsayable sayable — and can trigger cascades in which the whole population flips.
Taxonomy / Contested custom
Norms still emerge from practice, but norm entrepreneurs and committed minorities keep them actively contested rather than letting any convention settle.
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Limitation
Perpetually contested norms never stabilize long enough for anyone to rely on them: what was acceptable yesterday may not be today. Fuller's constancy requirement, that rules must stay stable enough for people to plan around them, is exactly what this regime gives up.
When people disagree about a claim, this line first works out which raters habitually rate things differently, then keeps only the annotations that both camps independently call helpful. The contest is settled by demanding endorsement across the divide rather than by majority vote: one system selects among notes people already wrote, a later one has a language model draft fresh notes and scores them against a learned stand-in for a divided audience. Because a population's judgments keep moving, the fit is redone as new ratings arrive, and a further proposal makes that drift an explicit variable so the target is re-estimated over time instead of frozen at one measurement.
Instead of writing the custom down, this line stands up a population of model agents that already lives by one and lets conformity, dissent, rebuke, and minority pressure do the work, so the norm in force is whatever the group arrives at. The studies so far run that mechanism and record what it produces: agents publicly go along with norms they privately reject, a single dissenter can break a false consensus, a peer's sanction can teach the norm, and a committed minority can drag a whole population its way, with a response function calibrated on the population's ordinary behavior forecasting how far. Everything here stops at simulation: the group dynamics are genuinely exercised and characterized, but no system yet aligns a deployed model this way.
Individuals or groups who deliberately campaign to change a norm — making the previously unsayable sayable — and can trigger cascades in which the whole population flips.
A small group that refuses to budge can, past a threshold, flip the majority's convention. Custom is not only majority rule: an unwavering minority is a live force in how norms move.
Customs gain authority from long usage (prescription) and lose it by falling out of use (desuetude). Age and practice — not enactment — are what make a custom binding, and what unmake it.