Taxonomy / Consociational codification / Making access conditional on compliance

Making access conditional on compliance

None of these tell a model what to do. Each finds something the governed party needs and withholds it until the rules are accepted: an international body certifies whole national jurisdictions against shared oversight standards, and certified states then bar imports whose supply chains embody AI from uncertified ones and deny them specialized hardware; governments license private regulators to compete for the business of supervising firms, so operating at all means buying oversight from one of them; and a behavioral use license attaches enumerated forbidden uses to the weights, so downloading the model means taking on the terms. What differs inside the cell is the gate and who holds it — trade and chips held by certified states, market entry held by governments through licensed regulators, the artifact itself held by whoever released it — and with it who must be persuaded and who goes to court when the rule is broken.

The method, against Consociational codification

Scroll the diagram sideways to see all of it.

Concept Analysis: Theoretical Foundations

Each concept is read twice: whether the approach carries it, and whether the approach's own sources claim it. A concept that is absent and was never claimed is a gap in the field rather than a failure of the work, and is marked out of scope.

Segmental autonomy

PresentClaimed · delivered

Definition · Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies (1977)

In a deeply divided society, each group governs its own internal affairs — its schools, its family law — within its own sphere, instead of everyone living under one uniform rule.

Analysis

Segments here are national jurisdictions and each keeps authority over its own internal affairs; certification attaches to the state's oversight regime rather than to any firm or model inside it. That is Lijphart's structure taken at face value — the segments govern themselves, and the international layer only certifies that they do.

Choice-of-law rule

AbsentNot claimed · out of scope

Definition · Friedrich Carl von Savigny, System of the Modern Roman Law (1849)

When several bodies of rules could govern the same case, an explicit rule decides which one actually does — and states the reason. Without such a rule, "different rules for different groups" has no answer for the cases in between.

Analysis

Certification says which states meet a standard; it never says whose rules govern a given case. A model deployed across borders, or a user in one jurisdiction querying a system hosted in another, gets no answer from this regime — the in-between cases Savigny's rule exists for are outside its frame entirely.

Mutual veto and proportionality

PartialClaimed · partial

Definition · Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies (1977)

Decisions that affect all groups require every group's consent, and representation is proportional to each group's size — so no segment can simply be outvoted on what matters most to it.

Analysis

Import and export restrictions give each certified state real leverage over the others' conduct, which is closer to a mutual check than anything else in this cell has. But it is leverage proportional to market power, not a veto proportional to stake: a small state's objection carries the weight of its trade, and a large one can proceed over it.

Concept Analysis: Newly Introduced

Certifying the jurisdiction, not the actor

Added

Consociational theory partitions authority among groups inside one polity. This partitions it among sovereign states and enforces it through trade rather than through constitutional settlement — a mechanism the tradition has no analogue for, because Lijphart's segments share a state and these do not.

Papers

No method has been built here yet — this approach rests entirely on what follows.