Each concept is read twice: whether the approach carries it, and whether the approach's own sources claim it. A concept that is absent and was never claimed is a gap in the field rather than a failure of the work, and is marked out of scope.
Segmental autonomy
PartialClaimed · partialDefinition · Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies (1977)
In a deeply divided society, each group governs its own internal affairs — its schools, its family law — within its own sphere, instead of everyone living under one uniform rule.
Analysis
Different jurisdictions' laws genuinely differ, so users in different places would live under genuinely different rules — autonomy by inheritance. But the segments are geographic borders, because that is how law comes packaged — not because they match actual communities of value.
Choice-of-law rule
PartialClaimed · partialDefinition · Friedrich Carl von Savigny, System of the Modern Roman Law (1849)
When several bodies of rules could govern the same case, an explicit rule decides which one actually does — and states the reason. Without such a rule, "different rules for different groups" has no answer for the cases in between.
Analysis
Named but not built: the survey recognizes that real law brings its own which-law-applies rules, but no one has implemented the arbiter that would actually decide, for a given user and query, whose law governs — with the reason stated. The tradition's central mechanism is present on paper and absent in practice.
Mutual veto and proportionality
AbsentNot claimed · out of scopeDefinition · Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies (1977)
Decisions that affect all groups require every group's consent, and representation is proportional to each group's size — so no segment can simply be outvoted on what matters most to it.
Analysis
Nothing gives any group a veto or a proportional voice. Law is treated as content to comply with, not as a settlement among groups.