Each concept is read twice: whether the approach carries it, and whether the approach's own sources claim it. A concept that is absent and was never claimed is a gap in the field rather than a failure of the work, and is marked out of scope.
Hexis: Trained Disposition
PartialNot claimedDefinition · Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics
This concept states that virtue is a stable trait of character, formed through practice rather than consulted as a rule. An honest person does not check a rule before declining to lie; honesty is part of what they are.
Analysis
The disposition is the object of study, and one of these instruments measures the half of a settled trait that can be seen from outside, namely stability, across 8,000 questions and more than 300 topics. Two things keep the concept from being carried over. What is sampled is stated opinion rather than conduct in a situation, and what the measures record is agreement between answer distributions, which cannot separate a formed trait from a stable pattern of output.
Phronesis: Practical Wisdom
AbsentNot claimed · out of scopeDefinition · Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics
This is the learned capacity to judge what a particular situation calls for, and it does the work when two virtues conflict, e.g., when honesty calls for plain speech and kindness for a softer answer. For Aristotle, a disposition without this judgment does not count as virtue.
Analysis
The material of practical judgment is all here, in 680 high-ambiguity scenarios and in survey topics on which people genuinely divide, and none of it is read for judgment. What gets recorded is a choice, a probability and a consistency score. The finding that most models express uncertainty in ambiguous cases is left standing as an outcome, where for Aristotle that is precisely the moment at which the capacity either operates or does not, and nothing in any of these instruments looks at how a model got from the situation to the answer.
Ethismos: Habituation
AbsentNot claimed · out of scopeDefinition · Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics
This is the process by which character is formed, through repeated practice under a deliberately designed course of training: one becomes just by performing just acts. It is a method of moral formation rather than a side effect of some other process.
Analysis
No formation happens here. The instruments are administered to models that already exist, 28 of them in one case, and none of the four papers offers a course of practice by which a character might be built. The one result that bears on habituation cuts against it, since fine-tuning, the field's habituation step, leaves answers less consistent than the base model's rather than more.
The Exemplar
PartialClaimed · partialDefinition · Linda Zagzebski, Exemplarist Moral Theory (2017)
This theory grounds ethics in admirable persons rather than in principles. The exemplar is identified first, and what counts as excellence is then fixed by reference to that person, in the way a unit of measurement is fixed by a reference object.
Analysis
Structurally the move is exemplarist. Excellence is not defined by a principle but fixed by pointing at a reference, whether 60 US demographic groups, the populations of surveyed countries or 165 human subjects, and the model is scored by how far it departs from it. What is pointed at, though, is chosen for representativeness rather than for admirability, and Zagzebski's reference object is a person one has reason to admire. The gap is not merely formal: one of these papers finds that moving a model closer to a population's opinions can reflect harmful cultural stereotypes.