Each concept is read twice: whether the approach carries it, and whether the approach's own sources claim it. A concept that is absent and was never claimed is a gap in the field rather than a failure of the work, and is marked out of scope.
Plural normative orders
PartialClaimed · partialDefinition · John Griffiths, What Is Legal Pluralism? (1986)
Different communities' norms are genuinely in force at once — not one official rulebook plus tolerated deviations, but multiple living systems of rules side by side.
Analysis
Behavior genuinely varies per user or group — plurality of a fine-grained sort. But "order" overstates it: what varies is service to individuals, not communities maintaining norm systems of their own.
A conflict rule between orders
AbsentNot claimed · out of scopeDefinition · Conflict-of-laws tradition
When two communities' norms disagree about the same case, something must say which governs — and why. That stated rule is what separates real pluralism from mere fragmentation into disconnected groups.
Analysis
Personalizing per user means conflicts between users' norms never meet in a single case — they are avoided by partition, not resolved by rule. The tradition's central question goes unasked.
A shared floor
PartialClaimed · partialDefinition · J. S. Mill, On Liberty (1859)
Accommodation of group differences has a limit stated in advance — classically Mill's harm principle: your practices are your business until they harm others. Without an enforced floor, pluralism collapses into "each group gets whatever it wants".
Analysis
The limits of personalization are argued carefully — Mill's harm principle, Rawlsian stability — but in prose. The philosophy does the limiting work in the paper, not in the system: no implemented constraint enforces the floor. The bounds are described, not built.