Taxonomy / Precedential adjudication / Assembling a body of decided cases

Assembling a body of decided cases

Here the work is constituting the record itself: rather than writing rules, a group renders verdicts on particular situations, and those accumulated verdicts become the standard the system is answerable to. The two versions differ in who decides and how coverage is reached — one runs a deliberative process in which a panel argues cases through to binding precedents (with a variant where a model is prompted to play that role), while the other builds a repository by seeding cases, having experts name the dimensions along which they can vary, generating variations along those dimensions, and putting each to public judgment. Neither decides anything new by itself; both leave behind a case book with an address, which the machinery in the next two strategies consults.

The method, against Precedential adjudication

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Concept Analysis: Theoretical Foundations

Each concept is read twice: whether the approach carries it, and whether the approach's own sources claim it. A concept that is absent and was never claimed is a gap in the field rather than a failure of the work, and is marked out of scope.

Reasoning by Analogy

PartialClaimed · partial

Definition · Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning (1949)

This procedure decides a new case by comparison with already decided ones. The judge states which features of the earlier case are relevant and which are not, and that selection is generally where the reasoning happens.

Analysis

Retrieval does find similar past cases, which resembles analogy. However, the resemblance is generally computed as embedding similarity, and no step states which features of the earlier case are relevant. For example, two complaints about a delayed refund may retrieve each other on wording alone, even where one turned on a missed deadline and the other on a billing error. In Levi's account the selection of features is where the reasoning happens, and here it is replaced by a score no one can inspect.

Holding vs. Dicta

AbsentNot claimed · out of scope

Definition · Arthur L. Goodhart (1930)

This distinction separates the part of a past decision that binds later cases, the holding, from the remarks made along the way, the dicta, which do not. Without a way to tell the two apart, a body of precedent cannot indicate which of its own decisions are actually binding.

Analysis

Stored cases are generally not marked up, and nothing indicates which part of a case binds later ones and which was incidental to it. As a result, the repository cannot say which of its own contents actually govern.

Distinguishing and Overruling

AbsentNot claimed · out of scope

Definition · Common-law practice

These two moves let a later court revise the record: distinguishing confines an earlier precedent to its own facts, and overruling sets it aside altogether. Both are done openly and with reasons stated, which is what keeps a body of case law open to revision.

Analysis

The repository only grows. No case is confined to its facts, revised, or overturned, so early judgments generally continue to govern indefinitely. There is no procedure by which a judgment that later looks wrong can be set aside.

Paradigm Cases and Maxims

PartialNot claimed

Definition · Albert R. Jonsen & Stephen Toulmin, The Abuse of Casuistry (1988)

This method anchors judgment in paradigm cases, i.e., clear cases on which agreement is easy, and in the short maxims drawn from them. A hard case is then settled by asking how far it sits from the paradigms, rather than by deduction from a general principle.

Analysis

The repository is built from concrete cases, which is the raw material casuistry requires. However, no maxims are extracted and no case is marked as a paradigm, so a clear central case and a marginal one generally carry the same weight at retrieval time.

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